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A Preference for Migration 
 
Abstract 
 
At least to some extent migration behavior is the outcome of a preference for 
migration. The pattern of migration as an outcome of a preference for migration depends 
on two key factors: imitation technology and migration feasibility. We show that these 
factors jointly determine the outcome of a preference for migration and we provide 
examples that illustrate how the prevalence and transmission of a migration-forming 
preference yield distinct migration patterns. In particular, the imitation of a migration-
favoring preference yields migration scenarios that would not have taken place absent the 
imitation. 
 
 
 
Preferencje migracyjne 
 
Streszczenie 
 
Zachowania migracyjne wynikają, przynajmniej do pewnego stopnia, z preferencji w 
stosunku do migracji. Wzorzec migracji wynikający z preferencji w stosunku do migracji 
zależy od dwóch kluczowych czynników: mechanizmu imitacji oraz możliwości 
zaangażowania się w migracje. Wykazujemy, że kombinacja tych dwóch czynników 
determinuje to, czy preferencje w stosunku do migracji przełożą się na rzeczywiste 
działania oraz podajemy przykłady ilustrujące, w jaki sposób wykształcają się określone 
wzorce migracji. W szczególności, imitowanie preferencji pro-migracyjnych prowadzi do 
scenariuszy migracyjnych, które w przeciwnym razie nie miałyby miejsca.
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Preferences play an important part in determining behavior. Heterogeneity in 
preferences is a major reason for variation in behavior across individuals. Stating that an 
individual behaves in a particular manner because the individual prefers that manner may 
plausibly sound tautological. But distinguishing the role of preferences from the role of 
other variables that impinge on a concrete behavior, inquiring into the acquisition of 
preferences, and tracking the way in which the transmission of preferences gives rise to 
conduct that would not have arisen absent the transmission, are anything but tautological. 
 
The preference-propelled behavior studied in this paper is migration. In a way, the 
migration literature is all about preferences and not at all about preferences. For example, 
when an individual responds to a wage differential by migrating, the individual can be 
said to exhibit a preference for a high wage. But it can also be the case that the individual 
who responds to a high wage by migrating is the one who possesses an underlying 
preference for migration; the wage differential merely unearths and facilitates the 
preference-prompted behavior. 
 
 
2. Analysis 
 
 
Consider an overlapping-generations economy. An individual lives for two periods: 
childhood and adulthood. Preferences are acquired in childhood through the imitation of 
adults. By the time adulthood is reached, migration preferences are fully formed. Adults 
can either have preferences that favor migration or preferences that resent migration. The 
initial distribution of adults between those who are inclined to migrate and those who 
disfavor migration is historically given. At the beginning of each period, N individuals are 
born. Each child has one parent and each parent has one child. Individuals acquire their 
tastes and preferences only during their childhood, and work only during adulthood. 
Individuals die at the end of the second period of their life. If migration takes place, it 
occurs at the beginning of the adult period. The “technology” of preference formation is 
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imitation of adults within the economy. For the moment, the technology is not 
characterized further, except for pointing out that it is exclusive - preferences are acquired 
only through imitation, and precise: if the adult whom the child imitates favors migration, 
the child will also favor migration; if there are no adults who favor migration, no child 
will favor migration upon becoming an adult. The assumption that children imitate only 
adults who are present in the economy draws on the idea that visibility is a critical input 
into the imitation process. Adults who migrated and who are not visible to the 
preferences-forming children cannot be imitated; invisible adults do not serve as role 
models. 
 
Suppose, first, that nearly all the adults have preferences that favor migration, yet none 
leaves; there is an exogenous shock that determines whether all, some, or none of those 
favoring migration can actually become migrants. Consider a case wherein the initial 
realization of the shock precludes migration. In this case nearly all the young acquire 
migration-favoring preferences and, should the exogenous environment subsequently 
allow free migration, there will be migration by approximately N individuals. Thereafter, 
there will be no more migration because the next young generation will have only those 
adults who do not favor migration to imitate. Hence, the migration sequence is 0, N, 0, 0, 
… . Alternatively, suppose that the initial realization of the shock is such that all the 
adults who favor migration can and do leave. None of the young will acquire migration-
favoring tastes and all migration will cease after the initial, approximately N-strong, 
migration. In this case, the migration sequence is N, 0, 0, 0, … . The result we derive is 
that given the process of transmission and the formation of preferences, the inability of 
the first cohort to act upon its migration preferences does not affect the overall magnitude 
of migration, only its intertemporal structure. 
 
Suppose, alternatively, that a sufficiently large proportion, π, of the adults are 
favorably inclined to migrate, but that only a fraction, p, find it possible to do so. Left    
in the economy are ( ) Np π−1  adults with migration preferences, and ( )Nπ−1  who do 
not favor migration. If the imitation technology is also such that preferences are 
replicated exactly proportionately, the new cohort of adults will have 
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inclined to migrate can now migrate, migration will be rising in time in the short run (this 
follows from π being sufficiently large) and the complete pattern of migration will 
become pπ N,  ( )( ) ( )
1
,
1 1
p
N
p
π
π π
−
− + −  0, 0, … . The economy generates more migrants 
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1 . What appears to propel migration is the evolution of a 
migration-favoring preference. Indeed, and quite interestingly, with a sufficiently large π  
(close to 1), a larger number of migrants is generated upon and along with preference 
transmission than if all the adults were to favor migration and to migrate at the outset. 
 
The same outcome can hold if there is an exogenous capacity constraint such that the 
per period number of adults who can be let out as migrants is a constant M , where M  is 
smaller than the initial number of adults with a preference for migration, that is, MN >π . 
In such a case, the periodic numbers of the remaining adults favoring migration are 
1( )N M aπ − = , 2( )N M N M aN M
π − − =− , 
2
3( )
a N M a
N M
− =− , … . Since π < 1, these 
numbers decline, and after a finite number of periods it must be the case that all those 
with a migration-favoring preference are able to leave; the constraint does not bind 
anymore and migration ceases. If the number of the migration-occurring periods that 
elapse until and including the period during which the constraint ceases to bind is greater 
than ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
M
N  , the imitation process leads to more migration than that which would have 
taken place had there been no constraint to begin with, and had all members of the initial 
population been of the migration-favoring type. 
 
Under imitation and an exogenous capacity (absorbing) constraint, even when 
successive generations decline in size on par with migration, there are no fewer migrants 
from the economy than when the constraint does not bind (and all those favoring 
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migration leave at the outset.) To see this most vividly suppose that the size of a cohort is 
equal to the size of the previous cohort less the number of migrants, M , and that 
M
Nπ  is 
a natural number. Migration will cease after n cohorts where the n-th cohort is the cohort 
in which the number of migration-favoring adults is exactly equal to M . With 
proportional imitation, the numbers of migration-favoring adults in successive 
generations are π N , MN −π , MN 2−π , … , MnN )1( −−π , 0, 0, … . Absent a 
constraint, π N  leave at the outset yielding a migration sequence π N, 0, 0, … . Under the 
constraint, the migration sequence is 
n times
, , , ... , , 0, 0,M M M M1442443 … . Since the last episode of 
migration occurs in the generation in which all those favoring migration leave, that is, 
generation n, adding Mn  to MnN −π  gives the total number of migrants under a 
constraint cum imitation, π N.  
 
Suppose, alternatively, that children acquire preferences by imitating only their 
parents. If the migrating parents take their children along and if all those who are initially 
predisposed to migrate can do so, migration (by 2π N individuals) will cease after one 
period. If, however, there is an exogenous periodic constraint, M , that allows only 
NM π< of the initial π N adults favoring migration to leave, M  children of the 
MN−π adults who could not migrate but wanted to, will do so subsequently (upon 
becoming adults themselves). As before, even though the adults who favor migration but 
could not migrate die at the end of the second period of their life, their predisposition to 
migrate (their “migration legacy”) is carried on, through imitation, by their children. 
Assuming that the children of migrants are not counted in the migration “quota” and that 
M
Nπ  is a natural number, migration will take place for 
M
N
2
2π  periods (with the total size 
of migration summing up to 2π N).1 
                                                 
1 The assumption that each child has one parent and that each parent has one child can be relaxed without 
affecting the argument. Suppose that parents come in pairs and that each pair of parents has two children. 
Parent couples can be one of three possible types: both parents favor migration; “mixed couples” where 
one parent favors migration and one parent detests migration; and both parents detest migration. If 
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Note that there is a sharp difference between the preference for migration perspective 
of migration and the wage differential model of migration, not only with regard to 
explaining what prompts migration but also with regard to predicting its termination. In 
the first case, migration ceases upon the departure of all n individuals with a preference 
for migration. This termination is unrelated to elimination of the wage differential 
between destination and origin, which defines the stopping rule in the second case. The 
preference for migration perspective thus provides an explanation of the widely observed 
coincidence of an absence (termination) of migration, non-depletion of the population at 
origin, and a positive wage differential between destination and origin, an explanation 
that does not hinge on the somewhat diffused concept of “migration costs.” 2 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
 
The main idea of this paper is that at least to some extent migration behavior is the 
outcome of a preference for migration. This idea contrasts with the usual approach that 
attributes migration to economic and social variables such as wage differentials, risk 
aversion, and relative deprivation. The pattern of migration as an outcome of a preference 
for migration depends on two key factors: imitation technology and migration feasibility. 
These factors jointly determine the outcome of a preference for migration. Deriving 
results pertaining to migration behavior and patterns requires making ad hoc assumptions 
with regard to the imitation technology and the migration feasibility, and the results 
obtained are sensitive to these assumptions. We have provided examples that illustrate 
                                                                                                                                                 
children imitate only their parents and the parents are a “mixed couple,” both children can acquire a 
migration-detesting taste thereby reducing the proportion of the population with a migration-favoring taste 
without selective migration by the migration-favoring type. However, if marriage is purely (positively) 
assortative, there will not be “mixed couples” and the imitation of the two parents by their two children 
will entail a perfect intercohort replication of preferences, exactly as in the case in which one child 
imitates one parent. While mating may not be based on migration preferences, it could be guided by tastes 
that correlate closely with these preferences thereby excluding the possibility of the formation of mixed 
couples.  
2 The prevailing explanation as to why migration stops short of the level required to bring about 
equalization of wage rates across labor markets is that migration is impeded by migration costs. The 
difficulty with this explanation is that quite often the direct (pecuniary) costs of migration are relatively 
low, which suggests that the impeding costs are psychological or nonpecuniary. This reasoning appears to 
come quite close though to associating nonmigration with absence of a preference for migration. 
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how the prevalence and transmission of a migration-forming preference yield distinct 
migration patterns. In particular, the imitation of a migration-favoring preference yields 
migration outcomes that would not have taken place absent the imitation. 
 
We have argued that preferences are transmitted through imitation, but we have not 
explained where the preferences originate in the first place nor why upon a particular 
configuration (realization) of migration it is removed from the population quite easily. 
(Savvateev and Stark (2005) provide a rigorous explanation of the evolutionary edge of 
the inclination to migrate.) Plausibly, a preference for migration was formed during 
human evolution when a change of location conferred survival edge and reproductive 
fitness upon populations who faced dwindling food supplies in given locales.3 Nowadays, 
as the link between shifting location, survival, and the maximization of offspring is no 
longer significant, the grip of the preference on a population may be tenuous, and it 
should not be all that surprising for the preference to dissipate. It is also plausible that at a 
given point in time, different populations are on different rungs of the evolutionary 
ladder. Thus, in the case of populations that are at relatively earlier stages of their 
evolutionary path, the preference for migration may still be hard-wired and will likely be 
transmitted genetically rather than culturally. In the case of the population we have in 
mind, where the link between a preference for migration and the chances of survival has 
been severed, transmission is wholly cultural; presence of the preference in adults will be 
replicated by presence of the preference in children if the adults are present but not if the 
adults are absent. In the case of populations of the former type, the migration preference 
is akin to a taste for sweet and rich foods (formed when food was scarce, hence 
concentrated sources of calories were valuable for survival and reproduction). In the case 
of the latter population, the migration preference is akin to a taste for playing the piano. 
 
The idea that the preference for migration is transmitted intergenerationally suggests 
                                                 
3 Populations differ in the extent to which their survival and wellbeing are attributable to their migration 
experience. Consider populations that over the millenia engaged in nomadic practices, or in shifting 
cultivation, or in exchange, commerce, and military pursuits closely associated with extensive movement 
across space. Conceivably, when the long run migration experience of a population had contributed 
significantly to its survival and wellbeing, the population could have developed a widespread and deeply 
rooted proclivity for migration.  
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interesting dynamics not only over time but also across economies. Suppose that 
individuals who are motivated by a preference for migration move into economy E that is 
devoid of such a preference. If, as assumed before, preferences are acquired in childhood 
through the imitation of adults, children in E will exhibit a preference for migration and, 
assuming that migration is feasible, will migrate. If, alternatively, the preference for 
migration is acquired by imitating parents and the migrants marry locals, children of the 
mixed couples could exhibit a preference for migration and, assuming that migration is 
feasible, will migrate. Thus, migration into E will be followed by migration from E not 
because the migrants push out the locals from their jobs but because the migrants inflict 
the locals with a preference that the locals did not have. However, the preference for 
migration could attenuate upon migration. The stronger the attenuation, the less likely the 
population in E will acquire and subsequently act upon a preference for migration. 
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